Gambari Must Now Prove His Effectiveness

By Aung Zaw
September 7, 2007

Twenty years ago, on the campus of Rangoon University, a masked student leader read to us a letter he had written on behalf of the people of Burma to the then UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar de la Guerra.

“We will ask the UN Secretary-General to take action on the Ne Win government,” he declared loudly, to cheers from his student audience. one hour later, the peaceful gathering was violently broke up by riot police and we were all in prison.

Twenty years later, many Burmese realize that it’s unrealistic to have high expectations of UN action on Burma. The regime remains unchanged, while we have seen several UN special envoys to Burma come and go, finally admitting failure.

In a new appeal to the UN, Htay Kywe, a prominent Burmese activist now in hiding, sent a letter to Ban-Ki-moon asking the world body to intervene on Burma. His letter was dated September 6, and was written by on behalf of members of the 88 Generation Students group.

The UN Secretary General’s spokeswoman, Michele Montas, told reporters in New York that the office of Ban Ki-moon had received several letters—including ones from the 88 Generation Students group—asking for the issue of Burma be taken up by the Security Council and appealing for action to secure the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

In his letter, Htay Kywe also asked Ban Ki-moon to dispatch his special envoy Ibrahim Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.

Shortly before the junta’s current crackdown in Burma, Gambari visited Asia to “promote positive changes.” He went to China, India and Japan—three key countries that support the repressive regime economically and militarily, while keeping quiet on its human rights abuses and brutal suppression of its people.

In public statements on Burma, Gambari referred to “progress,” leading The Irrawaddy to question his use of such a positive term. Now a leading American daily newspaper, the Washington Post, has questioned his work, saying the UN envoy is “missing in action.”

The criticism stung Gambari into responding: “I have been the only international actor to maintain face-to-face dialogue with Myanmar's [Burma’s] leaders about the need for democracy and human rights. In that context, I have been able to advance the international community's concerns directly with Myanmar's [Burma’s] senior leadership and with Aung San Suu Kyi each time I have visited Myanmar [Burma],” the UN envoy wrote in the Washington Post.

At a New York press conference, Gambari also condemned the regime’s brutal suppression of the peaceful demonstrations in Burma.

Fair enough. It is understood that Gambari has to play a delicate game. It seems his job is not only to facilitate the dialogue but also to “broaden the agenda” to include the release of Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, the cessation of hostilities against ethnic groups, humanitarian access and progress in implementing the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the areas of education and health. But can he achieve his mission?

Gambari is not the first UN special envoy to visit Burma and he won’t be the last.
Since 1988, about seven UN envoys, including human rights investigators, have been appointed to find a solution on Burma, but they all failed.

One of them, Rajsoomer Lallah, the UN’s second special rapporteur was denied entry to Burma during his four years in office, because of his criticism of the regime. He is noted for saying: “We are faced with a country which is at war with its own people.”

The most successful of the seven envoys was probably Razali Ismail, who broke the news of a “secret dialogue” between Suu Kyi and the regime leaders.

This Malaysian diplomat made twelve visits to Burma. In the early years of his term, he was praised for brokering talks between the opposition National League for Democracy and the junta.

His influence waned, however, after it was disclosed that he was part owner of a Malaysian company, Iris Technologies, which supplied the regime with 5,000 electronic passports.

The regime also suspected that Razali became too close to Suu Kyi and the then Prime Minister and military intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt, who was purged in October 2004. Finally, Burmese leaders shut the door, showing they no longer wanted to “turn the new page.” When Razali quit, he told The Irrawaddy: “It is best to conclude that I have failed.”

After Razali’s failed mission, Burmese leaders skillfully revived optimism in 2006, hoping to stave off growing international pressure by inviting Gambari, a UN diplomat who rarely visited Southeast Asia and was looking for a job after his boss, Kofi Annan, left office in 2006.

After a series of meetings in New York, Gambari traveled to Burma for talks with the junta’s top leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe. He was also allowed a one hour session with Suu Kyi.

That first visit was followed by a second. The junta controlled the schedules of both visits, including a call on the military-sponsored National Convention, which had been shunned by previous envoys who considered it to be a political minefield

The regime-organized schedule also included meetings with senior ministers at which they lectured him on the regime’s “achievements,” its “booming economy” and “road map” progress.

Gambari did say he wanted to see “concrete results” in Burma, although other statements were vague and contained the usual catch phrases and jargon.

Now a third visit to Burma is being prepared for Gambari in October. This time he needs to make sure he and his good offices are put to good use for the Burmese people, who hold high expectations from the visit.

I don’t want to discourage Gambari. I understand he needs to go to Burma to carry out his delicate mission. But everything depends on the generals and their political will to make positive change. They will be happy to receive Gambari as long as they find him useful.

Burmese generals and Burmese diplomats in New York know full well that the UN is toothless. Gambari needs to prove that he is not also clueless.